Scenarios for civil society



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Executive summary

In 2006, the Carnegie UK Trust launched an Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in the UK and Ireland.

The Inquiry's working definition of civil society has three dimensions. Civil society is understood by the Inquiry as a goal to aim for (a 'good' civil society), a means of achieving it (through civil society associations such as voluntary and community organisations, trade unions etc.), and a framework for engaging with each other about ends and means (arenas for public deliberation).

To better understand what might be the future threats to and opportunities for civil society in the UK and Ireland, looking out to 2025, the Inquiry applied futures thinking. With support from Henley Centre HeadlightVision, the Inquiry hosted a number of futures events across the UK and Ireland, gathering insights from over 400 individuals with diverse professional and life experiences.

The purpose of futures work is to 'disturb the present' and to help organisations understand and manage uncertainties and ambiguities. Futures thinking operates on an assumption that there is not one future but multiple possible futures, dependent partly on how we choose to respond to or create change. We can influence the future through our actions and our choices, even if many dimensions of the future are outside of our direct control. Exploring the extent to which we can affect change depends on our understanding of the drivers of change.

There are two reports that summarise the findings of the Inquiry's futures work. The first analyses the drivers of change that are likely to affect the future nature and role of civil society, looking out to 2025. Drivers of change are forces (social, technological, economic, environmental, political, organisational or legal) that may affect civil society, for good or for bad.

This second complementary report describes a number of scenarios that are both plausible and challenging, illustrating what the future might hold for civil society.

Scenarios are intended to help people imagine, understand and manage the future more effectively. They are not intended to be forecasts of what will happen. Instead they seek to identify what could happen in the longer term if there are changes in values, attitudes, social and economic structures, or in science and technology. The primary reason for developing scenarios is to improve one's understanding of the overall external environment, and to improve one's responsiveness and adaptiveness to change.

In order to 'disturb the present', one aim of the Inquiry futures reports, is to encourage civil society associations to interact and engage with the scenarios. A tool-kit and guide on how to use these scenarios is available as an online resource to accompany this report (www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk) .

The Scenarios

Drawing on the findings of the Inquiry workshops, four scenarios illustrating possible futures for civil society in 2025 were developed, summarised below:

- Local Life: Resource scarcity and energy costs lead to the regeneration of local life. Civil society has been in the vanguard of this process, and as a result has gained significant political influence. But there is insularity and competition between localities.
- Athenian Voices (Electronic Age): Technology and innovation leads to far greater involvement and engagement in politics, and in more inclusive debate. But technology can also facilitate and encourage atomisation; it indulges individualism and can transform media from a 'broadcast' to a 'narrowcast' paradigm.
- Diversity Wars: Cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity – along with social divisions arising from inequalities of income and environmental impacts – has led to conflicts between and within communities over resources and values. But younger generations have more in common – and large scale environmental problems require co-operation to be managed.
- Global Compact: The security state constructed for the 'war on terror' is no longer regarded as effective. Civil society associations have led the campaign against the exploitation inherent in cheap goods and together with global agencies play a key role in monitoring labour practices. But migrant labour, which is increasingly needed in Europe, is a different story. States oscillate between local populism and a global view.

Implications arising from the scenarios

There are a number of implications which emerge overall for the future of civil society. Since it is one of the intentions of this report to help civil society use futures thinking to improve its own planning and decision making, we have framed these as a series of questions that can be applied to this particular scenario set.

- How does civil society respond to the emerging conflict between conventional economics and environmental and resource issues?
- How does civil society help to support the spaces (physical and otherwise) where differences can be explored and reconciled about future values, social needs and problem solving?
- How do civil society associations prevent themselves and indeed society from fragmenting along socio-economic, ethnic and/or religious lines?
- How does civil society connect to representative politics at all levels – from the global to the national to the local?
- How does civil society respond to shifting notions of the workplace, more international supply chains, and to the increasing levels of economic migration which appear likely?
- How does civil society influence the development of technology so it supports the development of a 'good society' rather than undermines it?
- What are the future problems which can only be addressed by civil society and its organisations – and what is the nature of these problems which make this true?

Introduction

In 2006, the Carnegie UK Trust launched an Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in the UK and Ireland. Informed by an Inquiry Commission, chaired by Geoff Mulgan, and an International Advisory Group, the goals of the Inquiry are to:

- Explore the possible threats to and opportunities for the development of a healthy civil society, looking out to 2025
- Identify how policy and practice can be enhanced to help strengthen civil society
- Enhance the ability of civil society associations to prepare for the challenges of the future.

Given the vast scale and scope of civil society, the Inquiry has split its work into two phases.

Phase one of the Inquiry

The purpose of the first phase of the Inquiry was to identify and explore possible future threats to and opportunities for the development of a healthy civil society, looking out to 2025. To help achieve this goal, the Carnegie UK Trust commissioned Henley Centre HeadlightVision (HCHLV), an organisation with experience of applying futures thinking.

Using futures techniques, HCHLV and the Carnegie UK Trust:

- Undertook research to identify the key drivers of change that are likely to affect civil society (this primarily involved drawing on HCHLV's extensive database of social, technological, economic, environmental and political drivers for change).
- Held a series of futures workshops across the UK and Ireland for the purpose of gathering insights about what the future might hold. Around 400 people with diverse professional and life experiences participated in these events. Individual reports from each of the Inquiry events are available on the Inquiry website.
- Conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants.

There are two reports that summarise the findings of the first phase of the Inquiry's work. The first report outlines the analysis of the drivers of change that are likely to affect the future nature and role of civil society, looking out to 2025. This second complementary report describes a number of scenarios that are both plausible and challenging, illustrating what the future might hold for civil society.

Both reports are designed not only to inform the second and final stage of the Inquiry's work, but to stimulate further deliberation about the future of civil society in the UK and Ireland.

What next? Phase two of the Inquiry

Drawing on the findings of the first phase of the Inquiry, the Inquiry Commission will identify a number of 'burning issues' to explore in further depth in 2008. The second phase of the Inquiry will draw back to the present and identify how policy and practice might be enhanced in the near-term so as to better take advantage of emerging opportunities or diminish possible threats for civil society.

What is civil society?

Civil society is clearly a contested concept. For the purpose of the Inquiry, the working definition of civil society draws on the work of Michael Edwards[2] and has the following three dimensions:

Civil Society as **associational life**. Civil society is the 'space' of organised activity not undertaken by either the government or for-private-profit business. It includes formal and informal associations such as: voluntary and community organisations, trade unions, faith-based organisations, co-operatives and mutuals, political parties, professional and business associations, philanthropic organisations, informal citizen groups and social movements. Participation in or membership of such organisations is voluntary in nature.

Civil Society as the **'good' society**. The term civil society is often used as a short-hand for the type of society we want to live in and can therefore be viewed in normative terms. It is often assumed that civil society is a good thing, but this is not necessarily true. For example, civil society associations can help strengthen democracy and improve the well-being of deprived communities as can they undermine human rights and preach intolerance and violence. The Inquiry is therefore especially concerned about the strength of civil society associations as a means through which values and outcomes such as non-violence, non-discrimination, democracy, mutuality and social justice are nurtured and achieved; and as a means through which public policy dilemmas are resolved in ways that are just, effective and democratic. The actions of civil society associations alone cannot achieve a 'good' civil society. A 'good' civil society is dependent on the outcomes of and relationships between government, statutory agencies, the business sector and media.

Civil Society as **arenas for public deliberation**. Civil society is the 'space' in which societal differences, social problems, public policy, government action and matters of community and cultural identity are developed and debated. These public spaces might be physical in nature, such as community centres or conference facilities, or virtual, such as blogs. We may never share a common vision about what a 'good' society might look like and how it might be achieved, but we can be committed to a process that allows people of all ages and backgrounds to share in defining how the different visions are reconciled.

To summarise, civil society is a goal to aim for (a 'good' society), a means to achieve it (associational life), and a framework for engaging with each other about ends and means (arenas for deliberation).

Scanning, understanding and interpreting the drivers of change

The scenario building process drew on the analysis of how drivers of change are likely to impact the future of civil society, looking out to 2025. The full details of this work summarised below, can be found in the complementary report 'The shape of civil society to come' (see www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk).

Drivers of change are forces (social, technological, economic, environmental, political or organisational), that may affect civil society in the future for good or bad. Participants in the Inquiry events held around the UK and Ireland prioritised around 20 drivers of change (listed in Table 1) that are most likely to affect civil society.

Table 1: Important drivers of change

Social	Political	Technology	Economic
Rising individualism	Shift from uni-polar to multi-polar world	Falling cost of technologies	Growing socio-economic inequalities
Increasing importance of well-being	Rising disengagement from formal politics	Rise of pervasive technologies	Increasing concentration of corporate power
Ageing population	Rise of single issue politics	Rise of 'digital natives'	Increasingly fluid working patterns
Increasing complexity of family structures	Increasing visibility of the security state	Shift from media consumption to media production	
Increasing migration	Growth of the surveillance state	**Environment**	**Organisation**
Increasing cultural and religious diversity	Increased regulation of civic life	Increasing pressure on global resources	Increasing role of Third Sector in public sector delivery
Shifting sense of identity (identities)	Increasing importance of rights agenda	Scientific consensus on human-created climate change	Increasing professionalisation of Third Sector organisations
	Increasing role and influence of devolved government	Increasing private and public response to climate change	

Using an impact matrix, Henley Centre HeadlightVision analysed the drivers of change outlined in Table 1 and organised them accordingly in to three categories (illustrated in Figure 1). The first category represents contexts. These are important but largely certain drivers over which civil society associations have little influence, such as aging population and increasing migration (yet civil society associations will need to respond to them). The second category is those drivers of change which present the greatest uncertainties for civil society.

The uncertain drivers of change are variable, and can therefore be influenced by the actions of civil society associations. These important drivers of change have been clustered into the following headings:

- Limits of economics (such as growing socio-economic divides and pressure on global resources)
- Personal values (such as rising individualism and shifting identities)
- Shifting activism (such as disengagement with formal politics and the rise of 'digital natives')
- State and individual (such as the visibility of the security state and the regulation of civil life)

The third and final category of drivers of change are those which represent outcomes of some of the contextual and/or uncertain drivers (such as the increasing complexity of family structures and the 'professionalisation' of Third sector organisations).

Figure 1: Schematic of prioritised driver



Source: Henley Centre HeadlightVision.

The detail is explored more fully in the complementary report that explores the drivers of change (The shape of civil society to come), but for the purposes of this scenarios report it will be seen immediately that each cluster of uncertain drivers has conflicts within them and there are also conflicts between each cluster. **The Limits of Economics** is about the challenge to conventional notions of economic growth, and economic power, which is created by the emergence of climate change politics and resource shortages. Within **Personal Values**, there is a similar clash between individualism and well-being, but also between different diversities. **Shifting Activism** is defined by the use of technology around single issue politics, which in turn runs the risk of increasing further the disengagement from formal politics. While within the **State and the Individual**, the security state has a fundamental conflict, at least in the way that it is currently interpreted, with the importance of the human rights agenda.

Developing and using scenarios

Futures work is just another strategic tool. It won't tell you what's going to happen in twenty years time or even five, but it will show you a picture of a world that could plausibly happen, and challenge you to think about what that would mean, whether it should be welcomed or how it might be avoided.

Scenarios, of course, are not predictions, although they can be considered as projections. They are not intended to be forecasts of what will happen. Instead they seek to identify what could happen in the longer term if there are changes in values, attitudes, social and economic structures, or in science and technology. Signs of such changes are typically observable today, although they are not always easy to quantify.

Also, scenarios are not visions of what we want to happen; we may not like some of the possible future worlds which emerge from a scenario development process. The reason for developing scenarios is to improve one's understanding of the overall external environment, and to improve one's responsiveness and adaptiveness to change.

Scenarios have to be plausible and coherent views of the future, and they need to be able to explain the journey from the present to the imagined future world of the scenario. At the same time, though, they have permission to be creatures of the imagination, to take some risks with 'what might be'. This is what enables them to be used to explore the future and to help think about ambiguity and uncertainty.

As a recent report puts it,

"Futures work is just another strategic tool. It won't tell you what's going to happen in twenty years time or even five, but it will show you a picture of a world that could plausibly happen, and challenge you to think about what that would mean, whether it should be welcomed or how it might be avoided." [3]

It should be underlined that one of the reasons for having a conversation about the future is to understand the present both better and differently.

As Peter Schwarz of the Global Business Network has argued,

"The test of good scenarios is not getting the future right... The real test of a good scenario is: did I make better choices as a result of having looked at and understood both my own environment better and the consequences of my actions?" [4]

As values are so important in understanding the future of civil society, to develop the scenarios we chose not to use a conventional inductive scenarios process. One of the reasons for this is that such approaches tend to treat values as a given. Instead, we used a scenarios process known as 'Causal Layered Analysis', which explores possible futures as being constructed from multiple layers; from 'litany', to 'systems', to 'worldview', to 'metaphor'. No one layer is privileged in the understanding of the future (see Appendix 1 for further information about the methodology). The scenarios are built up deductively through the uncertainties generated by the re-framing of current prevailing 'worldviews'. (For example, if a current 'worldview' is that 'A few voices are privileged', then an alternative worldview might be that 'All voices are privileged').

Drawing on the material developed in the Inquiry workshops, the following four scenarios have been developed to illustrate what the future might hold for civil society, looking out to 2025.

The scenarios

Local life

For almost two decades now there has been increased global competition for energy, against a background of squeezed supplies. Prices have risen steadily, and kept on rising: the easy assumptions of the late 20th century about cheap personal transport and long-distance distribution networks are long gone.

There have been economic pressures as a result. Disposable income has fallen, and there is less variety in the shops. But there has been at least one significant benefit, because the cost of energy has made people use it far more carefully. There has, at last, been sizeable investment in renewables, often locally sourced and managed. Carbon emissions have started to fall as a result, if not as fast as campaigners and some climate change scientists would like to see.

The immediate effect of the energy crunch was that people spent more time than before in their local communities, and for many this was, at first, an unfamiliar experience. In some places, effective local organisations already existed. In others, they had to be rebuilt. The greater social contact of being around one's home more usually helped.

If energy was the catalyst for change, there were other strong trends which reinforced the new more local living. One was well-being; research showed that people who are more engaged with local social networks are less likely to suffer from stress or depression. Another trend was the concern over the quality and provenance of food, as well as campaigns to support local economies through local procurement. People also found through experience that effective shifts towards sustainability (or 'durability' as it is usually called these days) only worked if they had local support. And the 'new allotments movement' has boomed.

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

While some have suggested that this has largely been a middle class phenomenon, some poorer communities have been startlingly successful in using local skills to improve local infrastructures, using NGO support to tap in to the central funds which are available to improve local public spaces. At the same time, it is also true that the most spectacular failures have been in some of the poorest inner city areas. The critical difference between success and failure in this world seems to be the quality and availability of local resources, especially leadership and energy supplies.

One consequence has been the decentralisation of politics, along with more local budgeting. Local turn-outs have increased, while national voting figures continue to decline partly because local representatives are so much more accountable. The Swiss canton model has become the most studied in Europe. There are multiple centres of power within the EU, even if localism sometimes seems to tip over into parochialism.

Technology has meant that the economic impact of greater localism was not as sharp as it might have been 50 years earlier. Some still work for companies based outside of their areas, but faster computers and more bandwidth means that they are likely to spend more time either working from home or in local shared office hubs. People don't talk any longer about flexible working, but about the 'extended workplace', a phenomenon which went rather wider than traditional white-collar work. The 'plant on the chip' also means that manufacturing assembly tends to be done closer to home as well; the manufacturer sends the digital assembly instructions, not the finished goods.

One social outcome is greater intergenerational engagement, if only because people of working age are more likely to be around than they used to be, and this has led in turn to greater engagement by young people. The YPFs (Young People's Forums) have a recognised role in many local budgeting processes.

One of the biggest issues has been the increases in care needed by an ageing population. Here, resources have tended to go to national organisations which can offer economies of scale, and even though delivery is local, there are tensions here. One of the marks of a successful community is the extent to which it is able to attract and retain younger people from outside to contribute to its local economy.

At the same time, local communities are not always good at tolerating strangers – or the strange. People who don't fit in are often marginalised or excluded. Sometimes they have to move on. In richer areas, exclusion is sometimes more formal; some upmarket developers specialise in large scale self-contained gated communities, with the full panoply of surveillance and security. Beyond the merely wealthy, in a world in which inequalities are still persistent, can be found a highly mobile global class of the hyper-rich who are largely disconnected from these local worlds.

Some regret the loss of the easy globalism which cheap travel afforded. Online connections have mitigated some of this, with virtual connections between communities with shared interests. A Rural Forum, for example, connects rural communities with similar problems in the Highlands and Islands, the West of Ireland, Brittany, and Catalunya. There is travel, but speed is only for the rich. When people do travel, they tend to travel more slowly and stay longer when they get there. It can lead to deeper understanding and longer-lasting relationships than tourism used to.

The landscape of this scenario (Local life)

The dimensions are a way of describing each scenario across a range of common characteristics. Their purpose is to enable a more straightforward comparison of the different scenarios, and also to make it easier to connect the scenarios to a strategy or planning process.

Focus of economic activity	• Balance has shifted to more local economic bases, with shorter supply chains and more being produced and bought locally.
Politics: centre of gravity	• The political focus has shifted to a more local level, with greater local control of budgets. There is tension between the EU, national government and local communities.
Diversity	• Diversity plays out differently in different communities, depending on their cultural history, prevailing social attitudes, and the values of the organisations which provide leadership in a given locality.
Technology use	• Computer technologies and distribution networks have substituted for transport use to a significant extent. Infrastructure technologies (such as energy) tend to be more distributed (less centralised).
Resource agenda	• Resource reduction is managed principally at a local level. Central funds can be bid for to support investment projects which help to achieve this.
Ethical agenda	• Sourcing and provenance are important. Greater importance is attached to 'paying fairly for goods'.
Security	• International conflicts are most likely to be about resources – energy, water, food. The transition to more local economics reduces this – but isn't fast enough. Security is regarded as an EU responsibility, not a national concern.
Alliances	• Building links within communities is valuable (e.g. interfaith groups). Connections which increase access to central funding are also needed.
Sources of conflicts	• Conflicts between communities are more significant than conflicts within them.
Expertise	• Community building skills, social development skills, as well as traditional craft and gardening skills, are all valued.

Types of organisations

The table below illustrates the nature and role of diverse organisations found in this scenario.

Local associations	• These thrive. Existing organisations gain in influence, and new ones emerge.
Faith based groups	• Tend to be more effective when they operate under an effective 'inter-faith' umbrella. Influential in setting local values around tolerance of difference and so on.
Advocacy organisations	• Tend to articulate needs of the local world to national government and to the EU; and help less advantaged communities access national support and funding.
Workplace based	• As the 'extended workplace' becomes more virtual, so do trade unions. Sometimes taking the form of support networks for relatively isolated workers.
Political parties	• Are most effective when they act as a bridge from the local to the national (and not the other way around).
Service organisations	• Extensive co-creation of services with local partners, although budget pressures mean they tend still to be national organisations. A source of tension.

Athenian Voices (Electronic Age)

There aren't many places outside of a laboratory where one can talk literally of exponential growth, but the world of technology continues to be one. The prediction contained in Moore's 'Law' that the cost of processing power would halve every eighteen months, has broadly held good. The sums have to be done to be believed; by 2025, computing devices are about 4,000 times as powerful as they had been in 2007, for the same sort of price. Of course video and audio are commonplace, and pocket devices ubiquitous. But this is also a world in which a desk top computer can reconstruct a football match, live and in real time, from sensor data inside the stadium, and display it on screen in high resolution. At these prices, anything which can usefully have a chip in it already has. Information is instantaneous and mobile, while the real and the virtual exist simultaneously everywhere. At the same time, though, there are increasing shortages of bandwidth, and experts warn constantly of the dangers of system collapse, and even sabotage.

Because of the amount of processing power, the technology is far friendlier than it was in 2007. It is tactile and immersive, emotional and affective. If we still have virtual identities (avatars), they seem awfully like our actual selves, at least when we're in public rather than playing a game. Virtual work groups are surprisingly effective at getting work done, since the technology can deal with nuance of meaning, and even with irony.

Digital exclusion no longer exists, for everyone has entitlement to some technology capacity as part of their identity certification requirements. There are debates everywhere, often with high levels of engagement, but they are too often about single issues and lack cohesion and connection, fizzling out as quickly as they flare up. "Tales told by idiots", as a sardonic commentator wrote recently "and signifying nothing". It isn't always thus. In some places, where the political culture is stronger and more accountable, and the education system better at conveying the importance of citizenship, the world of online discussion does feed in to the public decision process.

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

But the world of Athenian Voices is full of such tensions, a fine line between virtual posturing and state control on the one hand, and public engagement on the other.

For example, many of the networks are owned by commercial organisations, and few of them are based in Britain or Ireland. There are constant jurisdictional disputes about whose law applies where. At the same time, the issue of trust is critical, and few of the commercial organisations are trusted. The universities have started to re-emerge as centres of trusted information and public learning, after being shamed by the radical Open University movement of younger lecturers and researchers. Libraries have become significant local public spaces. And the BBC, now a non-profit organisation mutually owned by its users, is also well-trusted.

But too much of the virtual life remains individual in its nature. Organisations which once offered cohesion have mostly continued to wither. The notion of 'belonging' to a political party has become quaint, and trade unions have continued to decline in importance and influence. Civil society organisations tend to concentrate on single issues, some are even 'mayfly' organisations, flowering for a moment and then melting into air. In contrast, faith groups are among the few civil society organisations that do encourage their members to think across a multitude of issues. Faith is flourishing – and faith based organisations are one of the few organisations left that resemble civil society past – built on volunteers and a strong criticism of individualism. Their volunteers are committed, and there is talk of the establishment of a multi faith political party.

Many of the experiments in new forms of political participation have not been successful, because they didn't help people think about the issue in a wider context. E-referenda are now largely discredited. In their place, more 'deliberative' methods, which help people explore the implications of a policy decision, have been more effective.

One of the biggest divides remains an inter-generational one. The so-called 'digital natives', who grew up immersed in technology, are now in their mid-40s, and represent about half of the population. For them, this world is a completely familiar place. Their response to any problem seems to be to 'build a software widget'. And even where the political discourse seems thin, there is often a rich and creative cultural life mediated through technology. The Creative Commons,[5] once narrowly concerned with issues of copyright, is now a broadly based campaign about access and ownership.

The vulnerability of the system was made only too clear in the Great Outage of 2021, which shut down large parts of the network for days, and corrupted data in other places. Even now, after a long police investigation and a judicial report, it's still not clear if it was a malicious attack by cyber-criminals or a technical failure caused by system overload. Whatever the cause, the outcome was striking. People reappeared on the streets and in public spaces. One of the unexpected outcomes was the emergence of the New Realist Movement, a campaign for 'real people and real politics' which was a tangible backlash to a world which they said had become overly dependent on the virtual. And today their supporters can be seen, all over the country, gathering every morning in public spaces for their morning Tai Chi sessions…

The landscape of this scenario (Athenian voices)

Focus of economic activity	• Increasing focus on knowledge-led and service businesses.
Politics: centre of gravity	• Point of tension as to whether representative political processes are connected to the virtual world, or whether they are disconnected.
Diversity	• Likely to see emergence of virtual online 'clusters' around the interests of particular diversity groups; unlikely to see coalitions of interests emerge.
Technology use	• Ubiquitous and rich, but with some backlash against the level of importance it has in everyday life.
Resource agenda	• Computing power likely to outstrip the ability of networks to support it. May be issues around amount of power used by virtual world, and by technology components.
Ethical agenda	• Fragmented; different campaigns will underline different ethical issues, but are unlikely to build coherent set of values around them.
Security	• Focus on security of the networks.
Alliances	• Few, since this is a fragmented world. In the physical world, inter-faith groups; in the virtual world, short-run coalitions of groups with similar objectives are likely.
Sources of conflicts	• Conflicts over trust, ownership of networks and critical technologies, and the use of technology for surveillance or monitoring purposes.
Expertise	• Technology, ability to maintain momentum for an online campaign among disparate groups.

Types of organisations

Local associations	• Likely to be relatively effective, given that much online and virtual use reside around existing social networks which are also likely to meet physically as well.
Faith based groups	• Emerge as sources of cohesive values with effective memberships. The effect is even greater where there is inter-faith collaboration.
Advocacy organisations	• Tend to single-issue, mostly short-lived, and often ineffective in connecting their agendas with representative politics.
Workplace based	• Have tended to wither as union membership has disappeared. Some employer-based activity, much of it anonymous and oppositional.
Political parties	• In general have diminished further, turning into temporary coalitions of single issue groups.
Service organisations	• Increasingly services are delivered remotely wherever possible using individual's universal identification code. Technology also used for prevention-based monitoring.

Diversity Wars

The long process of fragmentation of many European societies (and that of the United States) has continued, and in some ways become more acute, since 2007. Part of the story is economic: the inequalities and increased polarisation of the rich at one end of the wealth spectrum, and the workless poor at the other, a trend which dates back to the 1980s, has continued to grow. It has been exacerbated by a lack of social mobility.

A second layer is about ethnic difference and migration, much of it to fill labour shortages in an ageing society or – more temporarily – to do work which local workers are no longer willing to do.

And a third layer of difference is about faith, and competing religions. In a world where there is increasing competition for resources, global conflicts often find themselves echoed on the backstreets of Europe's cities.

That's the story on the surface, at least. But underneath, something slightly different is going on. There is an inter-generational divide as well – the younger generations, mostly brought up in schools where multiple languages are spoken, and different religious holidays are shared, are finding that they have more in common than separates them.

And civil society associations have started to find new forms of dialogue and discourse which are designed to rebuild shared values within and across communities. As the resource crisis starts to bite, people have started to realise that if they don't hang together, they'll hang separately.

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

Governments have played their own part in this, not least because they've weakened commitment to the idea of the nation by pursuing economic agendas which seemed to benefit corporations rather than their citizens, and promoted international policies which only sometimes seem to be in the interests of all of their citizens. Initially, citizens believed the rhetoric of governments that there is little that nation-states can do, and they turned inwards into their own communities and their own traditional cultures.

One outcome of this environment of mistrust has been high levels of citizen surveillance. The identity card scheme initially abandoned by the government more than fifteen years before was resurrected, this time successfully, in 2016 and has become a part of everyday life. Anyone not carrying their card is immediately under suspicion. The remote control helicopters or 'spy drones' are a common site in Irish skies. Right wing groups also gained momentum; older radicals were reminded of the politics of the late 70s.

But as more sophisticated responses emerged – in part from civil society organisations finding new language to challenge the prevailing discourse – governments found themselves having to change tack. A surprising bestseller in 2017 was the populist economic book, The death of globalisation, written by a young charismatic Anglo-Indian academic.

Her argument was simple enough: that communities and individuals were being blamed and even scapegoated – by the media and by politicians – but the problem was that the market had become too powerful, and that governments had failed (individually and collectively) to curb corporate market power. Economic greed was short-sighted because it created more losers than winners – and that the losers, eventually, realised that they had more in common with each other.

In the vacuum, two groups have emerged with some sense of identity; on the one hand, cultures with a sense of separateness, such as Scotland, or Ireland, or Brittany; on the other migrants have clung to ethno-nationalism to provide a sense of belonging. In all of these, language, history and performance are increasingly important. Due to migration in many countries more 'non-natives' are being born than 'natives', which has significantly challenged national identities and notions of 'inclusion'. Although such demographic data has played into populist (and racist) political agendas, and has been amplified by newspapers in a desperate spiral of decline and circulation competition, civil society organisations have managed to build alternative meanings around cultural richness and the re-energising of an ageing workforce. In this they are building on a story which is already visible. Popular culture – especially the music scene – in Britain and Ireland continues to be the envy of much of Europe because of its innovation and richness. One outcome has been a renewed focus on building and strengthening an independent media, led by civil society associations, with support from philanthropists.

Some say that this world is, in effect, a fight between the last throes of the values of the late 20th century, and those of the different world of the 21st. Thatcher's children are in their late 50s now, while those who benefited from the Celtic Tiger are only a little younger. Others point to a new cultural politics of the younger generation as a pre-cursor of new types of representation. And even others take comfort from some of the emerging business leaders who have declined their bonuses – or given them away. Something is happening – even if we don't yet know what it is.

The landscape of this scenario (Diversity wars)

Focus of economic activity	• The current 'globalisation' economic agenda comes under attack during the life of the scenario, as does the heavy levels of debt on which consumer culture is built.
Politics: centre of gravity	• Vacuum between nation state and local communities, filled in places by development of regional or ethnic identities.
Diversity	• Conflicts about diversity play out in different ways: destructively at an ethnic and economic level initially, but inter-generational conflict is potentially a force for positive change.
Technology use	• Technology is not a significant feature of the scenario, except in that it is used for surveillance.
Resource agenda	• Emerging agenda about reducing resource use generally driven by younger generation as part of a market critique.
Ethical agenda	• Emerging ethical agenda is about not scapegoating individuals or communities for the problems created by corporations and 'globalisation'.
Security	• Security used initially as part of a public management tool by governments, reinforced by internal surveillance.
Alliances	• Regional activists, cultural activists, and anti-market economists share a common critique but from widely varying perspectives
Sources of conflicts	• Significant conflicts between corporate agenda and that of communities. Governments have to choose which side to join

Types of organisations

Local associations	• Pressure to act as mediators/bridge-builders. Over time those that can develop new discourses frame emerging agendas. Cultural organisations important.
Faith based groups	• Faith-based organisations communicate well at a 'high' level but weak connections at a local level. Locally, different faiths have to re-learn tolerance.
Advocacy organisations	• Important to the transition of the scenario, by building new language and critiques of prevailing society. May find allies in faith and workplace organisations.
Workplace based	• Trade unions which are not squeezed by employers are likely to be influential in building critique of the effect of market economics on individuals.
Political parties	• Rise of 'extremist' parties that only respect values of equality etc. for their own 'kind'.
Foundations	• Supporting independent media/charities mediating or brokering relationships between diverse groups.
Service organisations	• Initially likely to fragment into provision for specific communities (Red Crescent and Red Cross). Later may be rebuilt at regional level, where this is effective.

Global compact

The attempts to make the world more secure by pursuing military and criminal solutions have long since been regarded as a failure. In their place, there have emerged new approaches which have turned out to be much more successful in reducing the level of terrorism and insecurity. It seems a long way away from the 'war on terror' which was promoted so assidiously by the United States and the United Kingdom in the first part of the century, but it turned out to be more successful. One of the unexpected effects has been that smaller nations, with little or no history of empire, have become influential beyond their scale. The new brokers in the sustainable security agenda have been countries such as Norway, Ireland, and Poland whose histories and long-standing diasporas make them better at dealing with multi-national and multi-cultural conflict. They are additionally trusted by most, and especially by those with less power in global negotiations.

How has this come about? A host of different trends converged to create a shift in international values. The first was the unsustainable cost of the security agenda, as resources spent on security squeezed out other public investment. The effect of the 'terror' rhetoric by politicians diminished through repetition. And there were other significant shifts as well. Judiciaries across Europe – and some in the United States – repeatedly threw out terror cases because they breached human rights law.

Civil society organisations have also been influential in spurring a shift towards social values underpinned by social justice. The faith groups and trade union activists who campaigned to promote fair trade in the 1990s continued their work on the link between consumerism, especially of cheap goods, and labour abuses worldwide. The 'cheap isn't cheerful' campaign named companies which were linked to unethical practices – a campaign which gained support from City pension funds, where managers had learnt that poor labour practices by companies tended to be an indicator of short-termist management whose share price was likely to under-perform, often quite soon.

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

International labour regulations have been beefed up under the auspices of the United Nations. The regulation now has teeth, unlike earlier International Labour Organisation (ILO) provisions, and the trade unions and faith based groups act as monitors of labour standards across the globe. A role they are uniquely placed to fulfil given their closeness to working people globally.

Companies also learnt that they got what they paid for from the suppliers. It only took so many expensive, time-consuming and reputation-damaging product recalls before they put more investment into making sure that they were getting the quality of manufacturing they needed. Even if it increased their production costs, they recouped it elsewhere in the business.

And this trend was intensified by those consumers – a minority, admittedly, and typically more affluent – whose buying habits moved towards owning fewer goods but of higher quality.

Diaspora communities also played their part in this social shift. They had long adopted the concept that one should 'think local, act global'. One of the interesting observations about the response to climate change was that it was most successful where it engaged people in their local communities, and diaspora groups reinforced this by creating new connections between their historic and cultural communities, most now clearly affected by climate change outcomes, and their homes in the affluent countries of the north. This raised funds for mitigation in the south even as it increased awareness of the importance of effective action to reduce carbon emissions in the north.

If this sounds too good to be true, it is. There are still conflicts in this world. Goods have become more expensive, both because of increased wages to producers, and because of increased resource and energy costs, and this has caused conflict even though overall incomes across Europe continue to rise. For some consumers the habits of the 1980s and 1990s die hard; there's always someone on a TV news vox pop, even now, talking about 'retail therapy' and their 'right to go shopping'. Although the focus on ethical business and ethical retailing has put pressure on firms to service poorer areas more effectively, poorer communities tend to feel the pinch.

And in a world where the affluent world is ageing, economic migrants were commonplace. Those with skills were welcomed openly, but many others (fruit pickers and other seasonal workers, for example) had become a class of nomadic employees, following the work and moving on, suffering low wages and lacking basic rights.

Where inequality was sharpest, or where local communities were poorest, conflicts would break out. Some welcomed the election of an Islamic party MP in East London as a sign that minority groups were becoming engaged in the political process. Others saw it as an indication of a new separatism. And there are always politicians, and others, who are happy to stir-up such conflicts.

Nonetheless, if there are still recurrent local conflicts, this is a world with a different international agenda. The global institutions which matter now are no longer those like the World Trade Organisation which engender conflict and increased inequality. Instead, global organisations are increasingly similar to types of porous and consensual models familiar, for example, to the Irish through their social partnership structures. Sure enough, they could be frustratingly slow sometimes, but that was a price that people were prepared to pay. A world where security was achieved through concentrating on social justice felt a lot safer.

The landscape of this scenario (Global compact)

Focus of economic activity	• Global economy with global trade. Increased focus on 'fairness' in value chain – because businesses fear repercussions for quality, reputation, and access to investment.
Politics: centre of gravity	• Shift towards negotiation through international frameworks – often slow and consensual. Influenced by local campaigns and action (on the 'Survival' or 'Amnesty' models).
Diversity	• Remains a source of recurring conflict, partly for economic reasons. Exacerbated by use of temporary migrant workers to do seasonal or short-term work.
Technology use	• Local and national civil society organisations – and their members – use technology to connect together campaigns which have an international effect.
Resource agenda	• Continuing economic development has meant that energy costs have risen and resource use has been squeezed. Individual behaviour has started to change as a result – towards buying less.
Ethical agenda	• The ethics of international trade and the long-distance supply chain are increasingly visible and increasingly scrutinised. But ethical impacts closer to home are sometimes overlooked.
Security	• The security agenda has moved to 'sustainable security' – that only by reducing the underlying sources of conflict, wherever possible, is it possible to increase safety.
Alliances	• Connections between faith groups and unions to campaign against unfair trading practices; local/global connections organised by diaspora groups; global civil society organisations well connected to international 'framework' organisations.
Significant sources of conflicts	• Conflicts between the poorest – often along ethnic lines. Conflicts between those who are still attached to a consumerist ethic and object to attempts by regulators or activist campaigns to impose limits on this.
Expertise which is valued	• International perspective and understanding, ability to build relationships across multiple organisations with different (sometimes competing) objectives; patience.

Types of organisations

Local associations	• Act as a bridge between local needs and wider international agendas. Re-frame global issues into language and action which is relevant and meaningful at a local level.
Faith based groups	• Strongly connected with diaspora relationships and issues.
Advocacy organisations	• Operating in a receptive environment. The most effective have built bridges with the global organisations which police agreements – and understand rights law.
Workplace based	• Trade unions articulate a rights-based and ethics-based approach to employment. Work closely with fair trade and human rights advocacy groups to monitor and report on labour abuses worldwide.
Political parties	• The decline of influence of the national political party continues. Where parties are effective, it is at a local level – or a European level.
Service organisations	• In many ways similar to the world of 2007. But like all organisations in this world they are closely scrutinised for their terms of service and have to be more transparent and accountable than in 2007.

Implications arising from the scenarios

Reviewing the scenarios as a whole, there are a number of implications which emerge for the future of civil society. Since it is one of the intentions of this report to help civil society associations use futures thinking to improve planning and decision making, we have framed these as a series of questions, together with some supporting argument. Clearly the following set of questions is not exhaustive.

How does civil society respond to the emerging conflict between conventional economics, environmental and resource issues?

The period to 2025 is most likely to be characterised – at a global level – by continuing pressure to reduce carbon emissions, and pressure on some natural resources, in particular fossil-based energy, water and some raw materials. Population will continue to increase, with consequences for food supplies. At the same time, however, action to mitigate these will conflict with the current dominant models of economic growth, regulation and competition, and related trends such as consumerism.

At the same time, there are signs of new agendas emerging around economics, ranging from accounting for the full costs of resources in the production process to the importance of social well being as a measure to counter the sole reliance on economic growth as an indicator of success.

Responses so far from civil society organisations have ranged across the spectrum from the collaborative to the confrontational; to the use of judicial and other institutional processes to get governments to abide by agreements; to examples of alternative practice; to advocacy, and so on.

How does civil society help to support the spaces (physical and otherwise) where differences can be explored and reconciled about future values, social needs and problem solving?

The pressures identified above will create a need for social transitions in which there are likely to be both winners and losers. This suggests that negotiation between different groups about the sort of future we are likely to have, the sort of future we might want to choose, and how to get there.

This means that there will need to be public arenas – both actual physical spaces and virtual electronic spaces – in which different people and different communities will need to meet. Civil society will need to act to connect these groups, to support and maintain the spaces in which they can meet, and to help shape their conversations so that they are constructive rather than destructive.

One particular area where civil society is currently particularly weak is in the traditional media; a key challenge for civil society associations may be to ensure that the market and the State do not dominate the new media formats as they do the old.

How do civil society associations prevent themselves and society in general from fragmenting further along socio-economic, ethnic and/or religious lines?

A recurring theme throughout the findings of the Inquiry's futures work relates to concerns that civil society associations and society itself will become more fragmented. A key challenge for civil society associations is therefore to connect and bridge communities or organisations. Also, civil society associations will need to consider whether their own organisational and governance models help avoid fragmentation.

How does civil society connect to representative politics at all levels – from the global to the national to the local?

A recurring theme of the Inquiry scenarios workshops was that civil society associations were good at talking to each other but not generally so good at talking to representative political bodies, whether at local, regional, national or international level. Yet civil society associations are not able to achieve their goals on their own. These goals also need to be articulated by representative political parties. Civil society associations can benefit from political parties which are able to create high levels of engagement.

How does civil society construct a relationship with representative political institutions, while not at the same time diminishing its role as a source both of independent critique of government, or of social innovation?

How does civil society respond to shifting notions of the workplace, more international supply chains, and of the increasing levels of economic migration which appear likely?

Some of the strongest of the drivers of change, and some of the greatest tensions within the scenario stories, are about the direct and indirect effects of global economics and global labour markets. These play out in different ways. In none of the scenarios do we see stronger organisation within the UK workplace, although the increases in manufacturing elsewhere is likely to see trade union membership grow globally. For the UK and Ireland it will be the most vulnerable workers that are likely to lack effective trade union organisation.

At the same time, some of the most volatile parts of the scenarios are where migrant workers – temporary or long-term – come into conflict with existing populations. These workers are typically the most exposed in the labour market and most likely to find themselves in exploitative working relationships. Yet there seems to be few substantial civil society institutions capable of influencing these types of workplace effectively, or of connecting the politics of the workplace with the rest of society. This is a key area where labour organisations and other civil society associations may need to form coalitions to counter the detrimental impacts of globalisation in its current form.

How does civil society influence the development of technology so it supports the development of a 'good society' rather than undermines it?

An increase in the pervasiveness of technology is one of the overall contexts in which the scenarios unfold, as technology continues to get cheaper and more powerful. This generates a number of issues. One is about distribution; technology is not distributed evenly within society, and this seems unlikely to change significantly. If it becomes more influential as a channel for civil society organisation, there will be people who are simply left out.

Secondly, most of the networks on which technologies are deployed are commercially owned, which may, sooner or later, have implications for freedoms of speech or behaviour, or for access.

And third, technology will continue to increase as a tool for monitoring, surveillance, and population control, which may also limit the freedom of action of civil society activists.

Yet technology has also been an area which has seen some of the most innovative civil society projects of the last decade, whether in the form of open source software, the Creative Commons initiative, or the free wireless movement. What can civil society organisations do to reinforce the use of technology in a way which supports civil society rather than undermines it?

What are the coming problems which can only be addressed by civil society associations – and what is the nature of these problems which make this true?

It is easy for civil society to think of itself as the answer to everything. But it is at its most effective when it has a clear identity and a clear purpose. Civil society associations sit both outside of the market and the government, and also between them. In the coming decades, which problems will be uniquely addressable by organisations which have that independence from the market and from government?

What now?

The status quo is not an option.

Looking back, in one generation alone we have seen significant changes in international relations, the global economy, communications technology and the rise in the number and voice of civil society associations throughout the world.

Looking forward, this report has illustrated that there are many forces that will change the future nature and role of civil society, for good or ill. Clearly, there is not one future, but multiple possible futures, dependent partly on how we choose to respond to or create change.

The Inquiry sought to explore the possible threats to and opportunities for civil society in the UK and Ireland, looking out to 2025. By applying futures thinking and gathering insights from over 400 people, this report and the complementary scenarios report has heightened our understanding of what the future might hold.

The challenge now is how best to focus energies so that threats are diminished and opportunities are taken advantage of. Given the scale and scope of the challenges ahead, much action may need to be collective in nature, bridging diverse civil society associations.

> "Futurism is the art of reperception. It means recognising that life will change, must change, and has changed, and it suggests how and why. It shows that old perceptions have lost their validity, while new ones are possible."
>
> **Bruce Sterling, Science Fiction Writer**

For the Inquiry, drawing on the findings of the futures work, this will involve identifying a number of 'burning issues' that are critical to the future health of civil society. The Inquiry will focus its energy on exploring how policy and practice might be enhanced in relation to the identified burning issues during 2008.

For civil society associations more widely, we hope that the Inquiry's futures reports and the accompanying toolkit on how to use scenarios (available on the Inquiry website) will stimulate further deliberation about how civil society associations might better prepare for and shape the future.

Andrew Siddall – civic Architects Ltd

Appendices

Appendix 1: Scenario Development Methodology

This report concentrates on the scenario building and testing work that was undertaken at the Inquiry scenarios and implications workshops (illustrated in Figure 2).

Figure 2: Stages of the futures events for the Inquiry



Source: Henley Centre HeadlightVision

To build the scenarios Henley Centre HeadlightVision applied a technique called Causal Layered Analysis (CLA). CLA was developed by the futurist Sohail Inayatullah to help think about circumstances in which values and underlying metaphors are a significant part of possible social change.[6] It is based on the assumption that the way in which one frames a problem changes the policy solution and the actors responsible for creating change.

CLA exploration of the future by thinking about it as a number of different levels, illustrated in Figure 3 (overleaf) and outlined below:

1 The first level is the 'litany' – quantitative trends, problems, often exaggerated, sometimes used for political purposes – usually presented by the news media. In litany, events, issues and trends are not connected and appear discontinuous. The result can be helplessness, apathy, or projected action ('why don't they do something about it?'). This is the futurist as fearmonger who warns: 'the end is near'. Equally, by believing in the prophecy and acting appropriately, the end can be averted.

2 The second level is concerned with social causes, including economic, cultural, political and historical factors. Interpretation is given to quantitative data. This type of analysis is frequently articulated by policy institutes. Scenarios projects sometimes concentrate largely on this layer. Underlying relationships are sometimes analysed (for example, population growth is linked to advances in medicine/health). The role of the state and other actors and interests is often explored at this level.

3 The third deeper level is concerned with structure and the discourse, or 'worldview' that supports and legitimates it. Discerning deeper assumptions behind the issue is crucial here as are efforts to reframe or revise one's understanding of the presented problem or issue. At this stage, one can explore how different discourses (for example, the economic, the social, the cultural) do not just cause the issue but help to constitute it. From understanding the prevailing worldviews, discrete alternative scenarios can be derived here.

4 The fourth layer of analysis is at the level of metaphor or myth. These are the deep stories, the collective archetypes, the unconscious dimensions of the problem or the paradox (e.g. seeing population as non-statistical, as community, or seeing people as creative resources). This level provides a response at an emotional level to the worldview under inquiry, and the language used is more concerned with evoking visual images, with touching the heart instead of reading the head.

Figure 3: The building blocks of causal layered analysis



Source: Sohail Inayatullah

Participants in the Inquiry scenarios workshops were asked to work down the building blocks from litany to worldview, before proposing alternative future worldviews and then working back up through future causes and systems to future litanies. By exploring different metaphors or different worldviews, and then working back through the layers, participants reframe the future and identify alternative outcomes.

It follows that the scenarios which are developed are deductive in nature, rather than inductive. In this respect, for example, the process is unlike the conventional 'matrix-based' approach popularised by Global Business Network, where the scenarios are derived from pairs of significant uncertainties.

If aspects of the scenarios seem challenging, it is worth recalling the remark by the Hawaiian futurist Jim Dator that "Any useful idea about the future should appear to be ridiculous."[7] It is worth reminding ourselves that there are no future facts.

Appendix 2

List of Inquiry scenarios/implications workshop participants

The Carnegie UK Trust and the Inquiry Commission are grateful to all who contributed to the Inquiry's futures work. Please note that all informants were asked to contribute as individuals and not as representatives of any organisation.

Name	Primary affiliation
Edward Andersson	Involve
Richard Atkinson*	Church of England
Ian Barcroft	Faith in Community Scotland
Carole Bell	Meadow Well Connected
Elaine Bradley	Volunteering Ireland
Jackie Butler	Common Purpose Ireland
Ilona Buchroth	University of Sunderland
Fiona Campbell	Voluntary Arts Scotland
Sarah Campbell	Scottish Executive
Paula Carey	National Economic and Social Council
Helen Chambers	Lloyds TSB Foundation for Scotland
Tom Costello	Atlantic Philanthropies
Mary Coyle	Aspire
Karl Cunion	Department of Trade and Industry
David Cutler	Baring Foundation
Vera Dakova	Mott Foundation
Philomena de Lima*	University of the Highlands and Islands
Sarah del Tufo	The Evaluation Trust
Malcolm Dean	The Guardian
Pat Devlin	Pendower Good Neighbour Project
Paul Devlin	Voluntary Arts England
Pauline Dodgson	Consultant
James Doorley*	National Youth Council Ireland
Hugh Donnelly	Co-operative Development Scotland
Alison Elliott	Church of Scotland
David Emerson	Association of Charitable Foundations
Hannah Eyres	Keyfund Federation
Honor Fagan	National University of Ireland
Geraldine Fennell	Care Alliance Ireland
Georgina Fletcher	Regional Refugee Forum North East
Patrick Ford	University of Dundee

David Francis	Community Action Northumberland
Colin Fraser	Jubilee Scotland
Faye Gatenby	Capability Scotland
Pat Gates	Dublin Inner City Partnership
Megan Griffith	National Council for Voluntary Organisations
Non Gwilym	Strata Matrix
Lucy Hooberman	BBC
Mbemba Jabbi	Africa Centre
Declan Jones	Herriot Watt University
Rajiv Joshi	Scottish Youth Parliament
Joe Kamanga	African Community Advice North East
Tony Kendle	Eden Project
Ian Leggett	People and Planet
Stephen Maxwell	Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations
John-Mark McCafferty	St Vincent de Paul
Maura McCullen	De Paul Trust
Louise McDonald	Young Scot
Siobhán McGee	Trinity College Dublin
Yvonne McKenna	Volunteer Centres Ireland
Claire McMaster	Sheila McKechnie Foundation
Marjo Moonen	Tallaght Partnership Ltd
Geoff Mulgan*	Young Foundation
Ronnie Munck	Dublin City University
Colin Murphy	Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation
Fidele Mutwarasibo	Immigrant Council of Ireland
Mohamed Nasreldin	North of England Refugee Service
Marie Navarro	Cardiff Law School
Anna Nicholl*	Welsh Refugee Council
Graeme Oram	Five Lamps Organisation
Eoin O'Mahony	Irish Bishops' Conference
Alex O'Neil	Joseph Rowntree Foundation
John Osmond	Institute of Welsh Affairs
Simon Parker	Demos
Tanveer Parnez	Black and Ethnic Minorities in Scotland
Sarah Pearson	Hanover Communications
Tony Pender	Carnegie UK Trust (Trustee)
Hannah Perrin	The Wheel
Cathy Pharoah	Third Sector Prospect

David Porter	Contemporary Christianity
Patricia Quinn	GuideStar Ireland
Robert Rae	Scottish Futures Forum
Judith Robertson	Oxfam Scotland
Gill Scott	Scottish Poverty Information Unit
Ruchir Shah	SCVO
John Shaw	Department of the Taoiseach
Wendy Shepherd	Barnardos
Maureen Sier	Scottish Interfaith Council
Frauke Sinclair	Scottish Council Foundation
Peter Singleton	Scottish Environmental Protection Agency
Matthew Smerden	Baring Foundation
Rebecca Stafford	Wales Council for Voluntary Action
Sue Stirling	ippr north
Sarah Stone	Age Concern Cymru
Jane Streather	Social Policy advisor
Robin Tennant	Poverty Alliance
Helen Tyrell	Voluntary Health Scotland
Áine Uí Ghiollagáin	Cúram
Tom Wakeford	Policy, Ethics and Life Sciences Research Centre
Barbara Walshe	Combat Poverty
Kate Welch	Acumen Community Development Trust
Karl Wilding	National Council for Voluntary Organisations
Rob Williamson	Northern Rock
Jonathan Wright	Scottish Executive – Social Inclusion
Carol Young	Scottish Low Pay Unit
Helen Zealley	Friends of the Earth
Hans Zomer	Dóchas

Appendix 3

Inquiry Commissioners

Geoff Mulgan (Chair), Director, Young Foundation

George Reid (Vice-Chair), former Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament

Fareena Alam, Editor of Q News

Richard Atkinson, Archdeacon of Leicester

Millie Banerjee (ex-officio), Board member of Ofcom

Kay Carberry, Secretary of the Trade Union Congress

Rajeeb Dey, Founder and Chairman of the English Secondary Students' Association

James Doorley, Director of the National Youth Council of Ireland

Daniel Finkelstein, Columnist and Comment Editor of The Times newspaper

Philomena de Lima, Development Officer and Researcher with University of Highlands and Islands

Seamus McAleavey, Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action

Charlie McConnell (ex-officio), Chief Executive, Carnegie UK Trust

Joyce McMillan, Chief theatre critic for The Scotsman newspaper

Anna Nicholl, Policy and Campaigns Coordinator at the All Wales Refugee Council

Maeve Sherlock, Student of Theology, Durham University and former Chief Executive of the Refugee Council

Neil Sherlock, Partner in charge of public and regulatory affairs at KPMG

Jane Steele, Head of Research and Evidence at the General Teaching Council for England

Ed Vaizey, Member of Parliament for Wantage and Didcot

International Advisory Group

Halima Begum – Education Adviser, Department for International Development

Tom Carothers – Vice President for Studies, International Politics and Politics, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Michael Edwards – Director of the Governance and Civil Society Program, Ford Foundation

John Gaventa – Professor and Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies

Shannon Lawder – Regional Director, Civil Society Programme for Central/Eastern Europe and Russia, C.S. Mott Foundation

Kumi Naidoo – Secretary General and Chief Executive Officer, CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

Gerry Salole – Chief Executive, European Foundation Centre

Carnegie UK Trust Inquiry Staff

Lenka Setkova, Director, Democracy and Civil Society Programme

Erin van der Maas, Research Analyst

Morven Masterton, Programme Coordinator

Endnotes and references

1 The tool-kit guide is available on-line at http://democracy.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/civil_society/publications.

2 Michael Edwards (2004) Civil Society. Cambridge, Polity.

3 DEFRA, “Looking back at looking forwards”, (2007), http://horizonscanning.defra.gov.uk/ViewDocument_Image.aspx?Doc_ID=192

4 Peter Schwarz, quoted in Blake Harris, “Scenarios of Prosperity and the Long Boom”, September 2001, Government Technology, www.govtech.net

5 http://creativecommons.org.uk/

6 Sohail Inayatullah (ed), (2004), The Causal Layered Analysis Reader. Taipei, Tamkung University Press.

7 Jim Dator, “Dator's "Laws" of the Futures (and of Futures Studies)”, available at www.futures.hawaii.edu/2006/06/jamais-12-jims-7.php [accessed 16 August 2007]. “While some of the future is contained in the present (and/or the past) and thus "known" (and/or "knowable") to everyone in the present, much of the future is novel and not currently or previously experienced. When these unprecedented aspects of the future are presented to people, they often react in shock and disbelief because of their unfamiliarity”.

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